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Abstract: 
Over the last 20 years, governments around the world have implemented 
strategies and targets to ensure that public services are efficient in the 
management of resources.  In the UK this common agenda has led to the recent 
‘Police Reform Act 2002’ in which consideration was given on how police 
forces can show ‘Value for Money’ based on government strategic policy 
targets.  This paper discusses the ‘Performance Radar’ technique proposed by 
the Home Office in the United Kingdom as a new public policy objective in 
order to assess police force performance.  We show, utilising an innovative 
nonparametric modelling strategy, that environmental factors and revenues can 
have significant effects on whether a police force is deemed to be efficient.  
Further, the results presents evidence that survey data should not be utilised as 
a basis to assess police performance. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Since being elected in 1997, the new Labour government instigated an initiative to 
establish whether English and Welsh police forces could be ranked into efficiency 
groups based on a range of efficiency measures.  This investigation led to the Public 
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Service Productivity Panel (PSPP) (2000) report, produced jointly by the UK 
Treasury and Home Office, in which Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) were recommended as techniques that could be 
used to rank the ‘economic efficiency’ of forces.  These procedures allow for multiple 
input/output configurations in a cost or production model in order to obtain efficiency 
scores.  However, as noted in the report, in order to produce comparative efficiency 
measures, it is essential that the services provided by police forces (the outputs or 
outcomes) be related to the resources (inputs) utilised by the forces in delivering these 
outputs (outcomes).  In addition, the final model specified should be robust and 
insensitive to small changes in the input/output configuration (a criteria that is 
analysed in this study). 
 Recently, however, the UK government has elected not to follow the 
recommendations of the PSPP (2000) report and has promoted the use of the 
alternative ‘Performance Radar’ approach.  The National Policing Plan 2003/04 
(Home Office 2002)).  This is a wholly output (outcome) based measurement 
programme to allow the public to determine whether their local police force can 
satisfy six domain criteria promoted as ‘Best Value Performance Indicators’ (BVPIs) 
on certain policing functions as specified by the Home Office.1  These six domains 
are: ‘reducing crime’, ‘investigating crime’, ‘promoting public safety’; ‘citizen focus’, 
and ‘resource usage.’  Hence, the aim is that these domains will show whether 
individual police forces are below a specified Home Office target or below an average 
obtained from a set of reference (or comparitor) forces.  That is, in line with the Police 
Reform Act 2002, police forces will now be assessed on their performance in respect 
of these six domains, although, their success or failure will not be based on the costs 
incurred or resources redeployed.2 
 These targets and ‘Performance Radars’ are consistent with the methodology 
introduced by the new Labour government in connection with ‘Best Value 
                                                 
1 UK policing is split into 3 distinct political jurisdictions, The Police Service of Northern Ireland, The 
Police forces of Scotland, and those stationed in England and Wales.  This paper is concerned with the  
latter group of which the Home Office is responsible directly for their ‘efficiency and effectiveness’ in 
policing matters. 
2  Indeed, instead of differential targets as proposed in PSPP (2000), the Home Office criteria of forces 
“meeting an annual target of savings/efficiency gains equivalent to 2% of their annual budget” is to 
continue (National Policing Plan 2003/04 (page 39)). 
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Performance Indictors’ (see DETR (1999)).  They do not, however, follow the stated 
public policy aim of Value For Money (VFM).  In the Home Office report “What 
Price Policing?”, for example, it was stated that “police managers need to work harder 
to ensure that VFM is achieved, for competitive pressure has to be created internally.  
The costing of activity with subsequent measurement and comparison of performance 
provide the means by which such encouragement is given” HMIC 1998, para. 10.  
Furthermore, by not linking outcomes to resource utilisation and costs, the Home 
Office is not following the recommendation given in the PSPP (2000) report where it 
states that, “Best Value is the central plank in the drive to improve police 
performance.  A systematic measure of police efficiency – where “efficiency” is a 
measure of the polices performance in meeting their overarching aims and objectives 
for the money spent – is crucial if Best Value is to work effectively,” (page 4).  As 
alluded to previously, the report further advanced the use of nonparametric and 
parametric techniques such that “this approach would also mean that “efficiency” is 
about finding ways of improving the performance delivered for the money that each 
authority and force has,”(page 5). 
 A consequence of the recent reforms to UK policing is the considerable 
reduction in the operational independence of police forces, and hence their ability to 
direct resources in the most efficient manner.  In the past, forces adhered to specific 
national aims of the government, but they had also a degree of overall independence 
in drawing up their Local Policing Plan (LPP) to take account of local issues.3  
However, the Police Reform Act 2002 has extended individual police forces yearly 
plans (once independent of the Home Secretary) to focus on a three year ‘strategy 
plan’ in which the Home Secretary now issues specific guidance to the Local Police 
Authority on the governments ‘aims and objectives’ in respect of reducing crime.   
The basis of this  new longer-term ‘strategy plan’ is to ensure that resources 
are directed towards the meeting the central government’s public policy of national 
aims and objectives, for example, to reduce the publics ‘fear of crime’. 4  If these aims 
                                                 
3  A Local Policing Plan (LPP) is a document that details the local strategies of reducing crime and the 
‘fear of crime’ in how resources are linked to the force’s aims and objectives and national objectives. 
4 For example, the Home Office minister Bob Ainsworth recently commentated that “Fear of Crime 
can seriously affect quality of life, perhaps more for the elderly than anyone else, and we take that very 
seriously.  The figures are clear, but changing perceptions is about more than statistics.  We have to 
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and objectives (targets) are not met, the Home Secretary is able to demand that a new 
LPP be written and, if still not satisfied, to implement a new Home Office LPP (Part 
1. Section 5).  Previously, the responsibility for these plans (under the Magistrates and 
Court’s Act 1984) had rested with the Chief Constable (independent of central 
government control), who would request the Local Police Authority to agree yearly 
strategies.  Under the Police Reform Act, however, the ultimate resolution of an 
unsatisfactory LPP is decided upon, not by the Local Police Authority, but by the 
Home Secretary.  Indeed, the powers of the Home Secretary have been further 
extended under the new Act such that he/she now has the ability to remove the Chief 
Constable, for example, if he/she is unsatisfied by the operation and hence the 
‘efficiency and effectiveness’ of the local policing force in respect of meeting the 
government aims and objectives.5 
 The new Local Policing Plans must, therefore, be drawn up with reference to 
how the Home Office is to assess individual police force performance.  Hence, a force 
or Chief Constable could be reprimanded if they fail to achieve targets, or are 
consistently below a national average with respect to the posited performance 
domains of the new ‘Performance Radars (see Home Office (2002)).  It is vital, 
therefore, that these ‘Performance Radars’ produce performance measurements which 
are consistent and unbiased with respect to each domain in order to ensure fairness at 
the local police force level.  A particular concern in this respect is that two of the 
performance domains: promoting public safety and citizen focus, are based on the use 
of survey data.  It is well known, however, that survey results can be extremely 
sensitive to factors such as sample size, sample selection, and the impact of 
environmental factors, such as socio-economic and demographic factors (see 
                                                                                                                                            
give older people reasons to feel confident that they are safer in their homes, on their streets and in 
their neighbourhoods than they realise.” Home Office Press Release 269/2002 (8th October 2002). 
5  That is, “if the Secretary of State considers it necessary to do so for the purpose of promoting the 
efficiency and effectiveness generally of the police forces maintained for police areas in England and 
Wales, he may issue codes of practice relating to the discharge of their functions by the chief officers 
of police of those forces.” Police Reform Act 2002, (Part 1. Section 2).  It is interesting, therefore, how 
this could be implemented in practice, as the performance radars, discussed in this paper, do not link 
the concept of ‘economic efficiency’ with outcomes, and hence no comparison can be made on whether 
a force is more efficient than another.  That is, a force might have a higher ‘offences cleared’ rate than, 
say the ‘problem force’ headed by the chief constable,  but at what cost was this achieved? 
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Waddington and Braddock (1991)).  The PSPP (2000) report, for example, expressed 
strong reservations about the quality of survey data and the use of such data in police 
relative efficiency measurement. 
 The main aim of this paper, therefore, is to investigate the potential biases 
which may be introduced into police performance analysis through the use of the 
performance radar approach.   We do this by contrasting the latter results with the 
relative efficiency scores obtained using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), one of 
the techniques advocated in the PSPP (2000) report.  Due to the reservations 
expressed above concerning the use of survey based data, however, we elect to 
conduct the comparison in respect of the three remaining domains: ‘reducing crime’; 
‘investigating crime’ and ‘resource usage’.  The other two survey-based domains are 
considered, however, in the context of the second-stage Tobit regression analysis. 
 As mentioned previously, one of the main reservations concerning the use of 
performance radars (sometimes referred to as ‘spider-grams’) is the failure to relate 
outputs (outcomes) to the resources utilised (costs incurred) in generating these 
outputs (outcomes).  Hence, in order to analyse the sensitivity of relative efficiency 
measurement to the inclusion or exclusion of a measure of resource utilisation, we 
conduct the DEA analysis with and without net expenditure as a specified input.  
These alternative  approaches are typically referred to as the cost and production 
methodologies respectively.    
 The performance radars produced by the Home Office (for examples, see 
Figure 1 below) relate the performance of a particular force, in each of the specified 
domains, to the average performance of a comparitor sample of forces.  These 
comparitor forces are “a set of between two and nine other forces with similar 
geographical and population characteristics.” (Home Office, 2002, p 2).  A 
disadvantage of this approach, however, is that the performance of any particular 
force cannot be contrasted with any other force in the sample, but only against the 
average performance of its limited comparitor set.  In contrast, DEA produces relative 
efficiency scores which can be contrasted across the whole sample.  Furthermore, 
DEA produces its own comparitor sets (efficient reference sets) which are composed 
of those efficient police forces which are most similar to a given inefficient force in 
terms of input-output configuration.   
In recognition of the fact that there may be external environmental factors 
(outside the control of individual forces) which may impact on individual police force 
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efficiency, however, we adopt the recent two-stage DEA approach developed by Fried 
et al (1999).  This is designed to “purge” the DEA efficiency scores of any 
environmental influences or biases.  Hence, they should be more comparable to the 
performance radar results, which do make some attempt to control for these 
environmental factors, albeit in a relatively simplistic fashion, by contrasting police 
performance only within groups of forces which are argued to be comparable across 
certain environmental variables. 
 Finally, we utilise further second-stage regression analysis in order to 
investigate the remaining survey-based domains.  Specifically, Tobit regression is 
used to investigate whether the survey results relating to the performance domains: 
Promoting Public Safety (the ‘fear of various crimes’), and Citizen Focus (“whether 
the police are doing a good job”) are related to the technical efficiency of police 
forces and/or to various environmental factors.  If the dominant influence is the latter, 
rather than the former, this would question the validity of including these survey 
based variables as elements of the performance domains used in the performance 
radar approach. 
 The paper is organised as follows.  In Section II we provide a brief review of 
the most relevant literature, while Section III discusses the two-stage DEA 
methodology, based on Fried et al (1999), and used to account for potential 
environmental influences on police force efficiency.  Section IV presents the two- 
stage DEA results.  These are the results from an initial DEA analysis and the 
subsequent stage two results which adjust the inputs to take account of the influence 
of environmental factors.  To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first paper to apply 
this two-stage approach to the study of UK police forces.  Furthermore, this two-stage 
approach is utilised in the context of both the ‘cost’ and production’ methodologies.  
That is, the DEA relative efficiency analysis is conducted with and without the 
inclusion of net expenditure as an input.  These various DEA efficiency results are 
analysed with respect to the results obtained from the Performance Radar approach.  
In Section V,  we analyse the relationship between the two survey-based domains and 
both the DEA pure technical efficiency scores and a range of environmental variables, 
as outlined previously.  Section VI concludes. 
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II  THE MEASUREMENT OF POLICE FORCE EFFICIENCY 
 
Although the PSPP (2000) report advocated the use of both non-parametric 
techniques (such as DEA) and parametric techniques (such as cost function Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis SFA), for the analysis of the relative efficiency of police forces, 
non-parametric estimation has been more widely used due to the difficulty in 
obtaining input price data for public service departments and sectors.  A number of 
studies of police forces have utilised the standard Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) 
(CCR) programme, for example, and analysed the stability of the efficiency scores 
due to changes in the variable specifications and/or input weights, see, for example, 
Nyhan and Martin (1999) for a study using US police force data, and Thanassoulis 
(1995) and Drake and Simper (2002), who both examined English and Welsh police 
force efficiency.   
 Other police force studies have considered the actual nonparametric program 
specification, and whether this has had an effect on scores.  The recent study by Diez-
Ticio and Mancebon (2002), for example, advanced a multi-activity model of policing 
activities in which they have two production functions using shared resources.  The 
results showed differences between the standard CCR model and the multi-activity 
DEA specification.  Drake and Simper (2003) also demonstrate differences in 
efficiency estimates across various techniques: CCR specification; Free Disposable 
Hull (FDH), Anderson and Peterson (1993) super-efficiency, and the parametric 
Stochastic Input Distance Function (SIDF), although they find that the rank 
correlations are positive (DEA and FDH equal to 0.39, DEA and SIDF equal to 0.67, 
and SIDF and FDH equal to 0.34).  
Finally, some researchers have utilised the technical efficiency scores from 
CCR programs to determine whether external factors have had a direct influence on 
ranks or scores.  For example, Sun (2002) regresses ‘technical efficiency’ scores 
against; location, jurisdiction area, population and the proportion of young people 
living in the area, for 14 police precincts in Taipei city, Taiwan.  Surprisingly, he 
finds none of these external factors have a significant effect on police force efficiency.  
In addition, Carrington et al (1997) regresses technical efficiency of New South 
Wales police patrols on the proportion of young people, government housing and the 
location of a patrol, utilising a Tobit specification.  They find again, following Sun 
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(2002), that ‘technical efficiency’ is not influenced by socio-economic, demographic 
or geographic external factors to the police forces.   
 However, a recent study by Drake and Simper (2003) has found significant 
environmental and geographical factors affecting English and Welsh police force’s 
‘technical efficiency’.  In this study, the exogenous variables utilised in a Tobit 
specification included; population, criminal offences recorded and 6 geographic 
dummies.  The significance of the geographic dummy variables in this study is argued 
to be indicative of the influence of residual factors which are not being adequately 
accounted for in the basic DEA analysis.  One possibility raised by the authors is  that 
the Police Funding Formula (PFF), which is supposed to ensure that the allocation of 
police force funding takes adequate account of the many demographic and socio-
economic differences across UK police forces, is fundamentally flawed.  Hence, any 
use of DEA, without adequate adjustment for the impact of environmental factors, 
could lead to flawed and spurious relative efficiency scores. 
 This paper extends the work of Drake and Simper (2003) significantly by 
introducing a new data set of environmental, socioeconomic, and demographic 
variables that could have an impact on policing and on DEA relative efficiency scores 
and rankings.  To the authors’ knowledge this is the first such police force study 
undertaken using such a set of actual external environmental factors rather than a set 
of proxy variables.  As mentioned previously, we further extend the non-parametric 
modelling methodology by utilising Fried et al’s (1999) slacks-based environment 
adjusted input specification.  These DEA results are contrasted with the relative 
performance results obtained using the ‘performance radar’ approach. 
An addition to the problems associated with obtaining accurate input price 
data for UK police forces, a further reason for utilising a nonparametric specification, 
such as DEA, is that no knowledge of the underlying functional form for the cost or 
production function is required.  All that is required is that some correspondence 
exists between the inputs and the outputs/outcomes across the Decision Making Units 
(DMUs).  The non-parametric approach DEA was originally developed by Farrell 
(1957) and later elaborated by Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) and Fare, 
Grosskopf and Lovell (1985).  The constructed relative efficiency frontiers are non-
statistical or nonparametric in the sense that they are constructed through the 
envelopment of the decision making units (DMUs) with the "best practice" DMUs 
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forming the non-parametric frontier.  This non-parametric technique was referred to 
as Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) by Charnes et at (1978) 
 
 
III.  METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
 
As mentioned previously, we utilise the two stage DEA approach of Fried et al (1999) 
in an attempt to “purge” the raw DEA scores of any impact from environmental or 
external factors outside the control of individual police forces.  In this particular 
paper, we restrict the DEA analysis to the analysis of Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) 
rather than examining issues such as scale efficiency.  Furthermore, an input 
orientated DEA programme is utilised as one of the key inputs specified is offences 
committed.  Hence, it is seen as desirable that policing activity aims to reduce the 
incidence of crime, while at the same time maintaining the detection rates relating to 
these crimes.  The latter being specified as an output (outcome) in the DEA analysis. 
 
 
A. Two Stage DEA 
 
For each DMU in turn, using x and y, to represent its particular observed inputs and 
outputs, Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) is calculated by solving the problem of 
finding the lowest multiplicative factor, θ, which must be applied to the firm’s use of 
inputs, x, to ensure it is still a member of the input requirements set or reference 
technology.  That is, let  be a [ ]mii1i y,...,yY = IM ×  vector of outputs of DMU 
, and let X  be a SI,...,1i = [ ]Sii x,...,1i x= I×  vector of inputs of DMU i , then 
pure technical efficiency is calculated by solving the problem of finding the lowest 
multiplicative factor, θ, which must be applied to the firm’s use of inputs, Xi, to 
ensure it is still a member of the input requirements set or reference technology.  That 
is choose 
I,...,1=
 
 {θ,λ} to :  min θ such that:  iii XX λ≥θ  
     Y  i
'
ii Yλ≤
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      0i ≥λ ,,  1i i =λ∑    (1) 
 
Following Fried et al (1999), the input slacks from programme (1) are 
obtained and regressed on a set of factors that are likely to affect the technical 
efficiency of police forces.  That is, we estimate,  
 
     ( )jjkjjkj ,,Zf εβ=IS    (2) 
 
where:  is the input slack j for police force k;  is a vector of j external factors 
that are likely to affect the efficiency of police force k and hence it’s input slack , 
 is a vector of parameters to be estimated; and finally 
k
jIS
k
jZ
k
jIS
jβ jε  is the disturbance term.  
The vector of external variables relating to each police force area consists of: 
proportion of lone parent households; proportion of terraced housing; population 
sparsity; proportion claiming income support; and police force estimate of day time 
population relative to resident population.  The inputs are adjusted using the 
difference between the predicted maximum input slack  and the predicted 
slack .  That is,  
MaximumI  kjSˆ
k
jSˆI
 
   [ ]kkMaximum kjkjadjusted kj SˆISˆIx −+=x    (3) 
 
The DEA program (1) is then re-estimated using the adjusted inputs and the first stage 
outputs to obtain new, Stage Two, technical efficiency scores.  These Stage Two DEA 
results are obtained in respect of the production and cost approaches to modelling 
police force efficiency, and these results are contrasted with the results obtained from 
the Home Office’s performance radar approach.  The Stage Two DEA results are also 
utilised in the context of the subsequent second stage Tobit regression analysis 
outlined previously. 
 To the author’s knowledge, little use has been made to date of the Fried et al 
(1999) approach to adjusting DEA results for the potential impact of environmental 
factors.  Such an adjustment is likely to be very important, however, in the case of the 
analysis of relative efficiency in public sector services such as policing.  Furthermore,  
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there have been relatively few examples of the employment of second stage 
regression analysis, particularly in respect of the impact of environmental variables, 
relative to the plethora of DEA relative efficiency studies. One such study, however, 
is that of Chilingerian (1995) in which potential environmental effects on the overall 
and technical efficiency of physicians were examined utilising a second stage Tobit 
model which regressed efficiency on a vector of explanatory factors including age, 
size of caseload, etc.  In the second stage model many of the external factors were 
found to be significant with the implication that the ‘raw’ DEA scores may be biased 
due to their failure to incorporate these external factors.  Similarly, Gillena and Lall 
(1997) analysed airport productivity and found, utilising a second stage Tobit 
approach, that factors such as:  number of airline hubs; number of gates, and whether 
an airport had a rotational runway, also affected the DEA efficiency scores.  Finally, 
in a very recent study, Linna et al (2003) found that socio-economic factors also had a 
significant impact on the technical efficiency of Finish health centres. 
 
 
B. Second Stage Regression Analysis 
 
The second stage regression analysis utilises the Tobit regression approach which 
takes the form: 
 
        (5) 
 ε+β=
otherwise
0y if
  
,0
x'
y iiii
f
 
where β is a k × 1 vector of unknown parameters and xi is a k × 1 vector of known 
environmental variables and the Stage Two PTE scores.  The first set of Tobit 
regressions relate to the domain: Promoting Public Safety.  Hence, the yi’s relate to 
survey results pertaining to the publics ‘fear of crime’.  Specifically, the dependent 
variables relate to the proportion of the respondents: ‘worried about violent crime’; 
‘worried about burglary’, and ‘worried about vehicle crime’.  The government’s 
Public Service Agreement (PSA) target 1 is that the level of ‘fear of crime’ should be 
significantly lower (at the 10% critical level) by 2006 than that reported in 2002 in the 
categories of violent crime, burglary and vehicle crime. (Home Office(2003)). 
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 The information on the public’s ‘fear of crime’ in these three categories is 
obtained from the British Crime Survey (BCS) (Home Office (2002)).  The British 
Crime Survey is an annual survey of 40,000 people across each police force, who are 
asked whether they have had a crime committed against them and their level of ‘fear 
of crime’.  The BCS differs to that of the police recorded level of crime as not all 
crimes committed are reported to the police, for example, a burglary in which a small 
amount of goods of little value are taken and the owner is not insured.  This has led to 
differences between the BCS and the recorded crime statistics published by police 
forces, see McDonald and Pyle (2001).  For example, according to the BCS domestic 
burglary as of 2001 is down by 39% since 1997, but burglary crime recorded by the 
police was up by 28% in 2001 relative to the previous year.  
  The final second stage Tobit regression relates to the remaining survey 
based performance domain specified by the Home Office: Citizen Focus.  In this case 
the independent variables are the same as those specified for the Promoting Public 
Safety domain, but the dependent variable is the survey responses relating to 
‘residents thinking the police do a good job’.  This survey data is again taken from the 
British Crime Survey which monitors the response to the question “how good a job do 
the police do?”  In the Tobit regression the dependent variable is the percentage of 
respondents indicating “good” or “excellent” in answer to this question. 
 
 
C. Data 
 
The literature on modelling the efficiency of police forces has led economists to posit 
two methodologies, the cost and the production approach.  The former relates 
inputs/costs to possible outputs/outcomes (such as offences cleared): see early cost 
function estimation of US policing by Darrough and Heineke (1979), Gyapong and 
Gyimah-Brempong (1988)) and more recently Nyhan and Martin (1999); and for the 
UK, Cameron (1989), Drake and Simper (2000).  The latter methodology relates the 
number of offences committed to the effectiveness of forces in offences cleared: see 
Thanassoulis (1995) for a UK example, Sun (2002) for a Taiwanese example, and 
finally Diez-Ticio and Mancebon (2000) for an example of the production approach 
utilised to assess the efficiency of Spanish policing. 
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 This paper presents comparative results utilising both the production (Model 
One) and cost (Model Two) methodologies, providing a further innovation in the 
literature.  The former methodology adheres closely to the Home Office Performance 
Radar by utilising only the number of offences as inputs, while the latter has an 
additional input variable, police force costs.  In Model One, therefore, the inputs 
relate to offences committed and, following the break down given by the Home Office 
(2002), are: ‘Number of Burglaries’, ‘Number of Vehicle Crimes’, and ‘Number of 
Robberies’.  In Model Two, we also include net expenditure as an additional input 
variable.  In specifying the incidences of various categories of crimes as inputs in both 
these DEA models, therefore, we are ensuring that the relative efficiency analysis 
adequately captures the performance domain of: Reducing Crime, as specified by the 
Home Office (2002).6 
 In terms of outputs, this study again follows the Home Office (2002) 
Performance Radar approach by specifying the outputs (outcomes):  ‘Total Offences 
Cleared’, and ‘Police and Civilian Days Lost’ (suitably transformed into a more is 
better variable).  The first output has been utilised by, for example, Nyhan and Martin 
(1999).  Due to the small number of forces present in our sample (41), however, 
utilising separate offences cleared for ; ‘burglaries’, ‘violent crimes’, and ‘robberies’, 
would be likely to result in many forces being located on the efficient  frontier.   
Hence, we prefer to specify the aggregate of offences cleared. 
The utilisation of ‘days lost to illness’ follows the recommendations of the 
first official UK government sponsored study into measuring Police Efficiency (Home 
Office, Demonstration Project (2001)).  In this report it was argued, for example, that 
this variable can be thought of as a managerial activity variable in which it would be 
desirable to reduce the incidence of sickness absence in police forces.  Indeed, it may 
well be that ‘days lost’ are actually a symptom of an underlying morale or 
management problem, and may therefore be related to poor performance in other key 
output (outcome) areas.   
Once again, the outputs specified allow us to capture the two other, non-
survey based, performance domains:  Investigating Crime and Resource Usage.  The 
                                                 
6  For example, the first Home Office’s Public Service Agreement (PSA), PSA 1 is to: reduce recorded 
vehicle crime by 30% by 31st March 2004; domestic burglary by 25% by March 2005; and robbery in 
principle cities by 14% by 2005. (Home Office (2002)). 
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next section presents a discussion of the empirical results obtained using these 
input/output configurations. 
 
 
IV.  THE EFFECT OF ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS ON FORCE 
EFFICIENCY 
 
Table 1 provides details of the pure technical efficiency results (PTE).  As explained 
previously, these are provided in respect of two model specifications with respect to 
policing activity.  Specifically, Model Two differs from Model One in terms of 
specifying an additional input, net expenditure.  Furthermore, for both these models, 
two sets of results are provided.  The Stage One results represent what might be 
termed the “raw PTE scores”, while the Stage Two results represent an attempt to 
purge these raw DEA scores of any environmental influences.  As detailed previously, 
this amounts to regressing the relevant input slacks on the specified set of 
environmental variables and using these regression results to produce adjusted input 
levels for each police force.  These adjusted input levels are then used, in conjunction 
with the original output data, in order to produce the Stage Two PTE results. 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 
 
 Concentrating initially on the contrast between the Model One and Two (Stage 
One) results, it is clear from Table 1 that, in respect of those forces deemed to be 
inefficient, the PTE scores are generally much lower under the Model One 
specification, and also exhibit much greater diversity.  This is graphically illustrated 
by the cases of the Cleveland and Cambridgeshire forces, which exhibit Model One 
PTE scores of 14.40 and 16.10 respectively, but record Model Two PTE scores of 
67.30 and 74.30.  For the sample as a whole, the mean PTE score under Model One is 
only 54.89 in contrast to the mean of 76.55 for Model Two, while the greater diversity 
of efficiency scores under Model One is evident from the comparative minimum 
scores (14.4, 40.2) and standard deviations (31.46, 17.31). 
 Despite the marked contrast in the relative efficiency scores across Models 
One and Two, however, it is frequently the case that the efficiency ranks are relatively 
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unaffected.  The Avon and Somerset force, for example, is ranked at 39th and 41st by 
Models One and Two respectively, while the Hertfordshire force is ranked 38th and 
40th.  At the other end of the relative efficiency spectrum, the majority of the forces 
which are technically efficient (and ranked joint 1st) under Model One are also 
technically efficient under Model Two.  The nine forces which exhibit pure technical 
efficiency under both model specifications are: Bedfordshire; Dyfed Powys; Gwent; 
Hampshire; Northamptonshire; Northumbria; South Wales; Suffolk, and West 
Midlands.  This strong correspondence between the two sets of relative efficiency 
scores in terms of rankings is also evident in the Spearman’s rank correlation 
coefficient of 0.75 (significant at the 1% critical level). 
 Notwithstanding this strong ranking correspondence, however, it is quite clear 
that certain forces do exhibit marked differences in both relative efficiency scores and 
ranks across Models One and Two.  The most striking example of this is the case of 
the Warwickshire force which exhibits a PTE score of only 25.6 (rank 32nd) under 
Model One, but a score of 100 (rank 1st) under the Model Two specification.  Other 
less extreme examples includes the Cambridgeshire force (Model One PTE = 16.10, 
rank 40th, Model Two PTE = 74.30, rank = 19th) and the Wiltshire force (Model One 
PTE = 38.90, rank 23rd, Model Two PTE = 81.80, rank 15th).  These examples 
illustrate very clearly that police forces can be significantly disadvantaged by the 
failure to relate outcomes such as crime clear-ups to a measure of resource costs, as 
well as to inputs relating to other performance domains such as the incidences of 
various categories of crime.  It is significant to note in this respect, therefore, that the 
so-called ‘performance radars’ recently introduced by the Home Office to assess 
relative police force performance focus solely on the outcomes in the various 
specified domains outlined in Section I.  No attempt is made to relate these outcomes 
to the resources, and resource costs, utilised to generate them.  As the examples given 
above clearly illustrate, this can produce highly misleading relative performance 
indicators, and ones which do not relate to genuine efficiency measurement in the 
context of relating outputs (outcomes) to inputs (resources). 
 A possible explanation for the wide diversity of the Stage One PTE scores, 
particularly with respect to Model One, is that there are environmental factors which 
may impact on police performance in the various domains, but which are not captured 
in the DEA analysis.  As discussed previously, it is for this reason that we attempt to 
purge the DEA relative efficiency scores of any potential environmental influences 
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using the two stage process advocated by Fried et al (1999).  The resultant Stage Two 
PTE scores are reported in Table 1 for both Models One and Two.  As might be 
expected, the incorporation of environmental factors does appear to have an important 
influence upon the relative efficiency of English and Welsh police forces.  If we 
contrast the Model One results under Stage One and Stage Two, for example, it is 
clear that the appropriate incorporation of environmental factors raises the mean PTE 
efficiency score, from 54.89 to 78.86, and also considerably reduces the degree of 
diversity in performance.  With respect to the latter, the minimum PTE score 
increases from 14.4 to 40.9, while the standard deviation declines from 31.46 to 
14.99.  As with the contrast between the Model One and Model Two (Stage One) 
results, the incorporation of environmental factors does not have a marked impact on 
the efficiency rankings in many cases.  However, given the intention of using relative 
performance indicators as the basis for constructing police efficiency groupings and 
for resourcing decisions, etc, as stated in the PSPP (2000) report, even relatively 
modest changes in efficiency rankings could have important implications.  
Furthermore, some changes in efficiency rankings are far from modest.  The 
Cambridgeshire force, for example, would be ranked at 40th (PTE = 16.10) under 
Model One Stage One, but ranked at 29th under Stage Two.  Conversely, the South 
Yorkshire force would be ranked at 24th (PTE = 37.80) under Stage One, but ranked at 
39th (PTE = 56.0) under Stage Two. 
 As outlined previously, the police funding formula is designed to relate the 
funding and resourcing of police forces to their perceived needs, and hence to take 
account of environmental factors which may impact on criminal activity, etc.  Hence, 
it would be expected that, if the police funding formula is an appropriate way of 
adjusting resourcing to reflect environmental factors, there would be little difference 
between the Stage One and Two PTE results for Model Two.  It is clear from Table 1, 
however, that in moving from the Stage One to Stage Two results, the mean PTE 
score increases from 76.55 to 83.93, while the minimum PTE score increases from 
40.2 to 52.  Furthermore, the diversity in PTE scores across police forces also 
declines, as is evident from the reduction in the standard deviation of the PTE scores 
from 17.31 under Stage One to 13.00 under Stage Two.  Once again, the significant 
feature of these results is that the relative efficiency rankings of individual police 
forces can be significantly affected by the failure to adequately take account of 
environmental factors.  The most extreme example of this impact is in the case of the 
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South Wales force where the Model Two PTE rank increases from 26th (PTE = 69.80) 
to 1st (PTE = 100).  In the case of the Suffolk force, however, the efficiency rank 
declines from 1st (PTE = 100) to 14th (PTE = 92.90).  It is clear from this analysis, 
therefore, that the incorporation of environment factors is of crucial importance in 
respect of any robust analysis of relative police force performance / efficiency.  
Furthermore, the sensitivity of the Model Two PTE results to the Stage One and Two 
analysis strongly suggests that the use of the Police Funding Formula is not adequate 
in respect of creating a “level playing field” from which to assess relative police force 
efficiency. 
 Having undertaken a rigorous analysis of police force efficiency using DEA 
under two alternative model specifications, and with and without the adjustment for 
environmental factors, it is potentially illuminating to contrast these results with those 
obtained from the ‘performance radar’ analysis produced by the Home Office (2002).  
Clearly, given the input/output (outcome) configurations adopted in the DEA analysis, 
it is only appropriate to contrast police performance across three of the five domains 
(reducing crime, investigating crime and resource usage).  As emphasised previously, 
however, reservations can be expressed concerning the use of survey data as a basis 
on which to conduct police performance comparisons, as in the two remaining 
domains (citizen focus and promoting public safety).  Furthermore, as will be seen 
from the comparisons discussed below, for the vast majority of police forces, these 
two performance domains tend to have very little discriminatory power.  Specifically, 
performance across these two domains tends to be very similar to the average 
performance across the other comparator forces, as chosen by the Home Office.  For 
completeness, however, in Section V we do investigate the relationship between the 
DEA results (under both Model specifications and under Stages One and Two) and 
the performance measures in these two remaining domains. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1  
 
 It is clear from the performance radar analysis (Home Office, 2002), that the 
two best performing forces across the three relevant domains (and especially in 
respect of reducing and investigating crime) are the Dyfed-Powys and Gwent forces.  
Their superior performances are clearly illustrated in Figure 1.  It is interesting to 
note, therefore, that these forces are found to be consistently efficient (ranked 1st) 
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across all the DEA permutations reported in Table 1.  A further force which displays 
performance which is well above average in respect of reducing and investigating 
crime is the Hampshire force.  Once again, it is clear from Table 2 that this force is 
also ranked as consistently efficient under the alternative DEA specifications. 
 At the other end of the performance spectrum, it is clear from Table 1 that the 
Avon and Somerset force is consistently one of the worst performing forces.  It is 
ranked 41st out of 41 forces in three out of the four DEA specifications, and is ranked 
39th according to the Model One Stage Two analysis.  In Figure 1, this very poor 
performance across the relevant three domains is also evident in the ‘performance 
radar’ analysis, and clearly represents the worst performance of any police force 
across these domains.   
 Hence, it is clear that in the most extreme cases of exceptional or poor 
performance, there is a very strong correspondence between the DEA results and the 
performance radar evidence, notwithstanding the methodological reservations 
concerning the latter.  A further comparison of the two sets of performance results, 
however, confirms the methodological inadequacies of the Home Office’s approach 
and indicates that the simplistic performance radar approach can produce highly 
misleading relative performance results.  The Northumbria and Suffolk forces 
represent cases in point.  It is clear from Figure 1, that both forces exhibit 
performances which are well above average across the three relevant domains.  
Furthermore, Table 1 illustrates that these forces are also rated as highly efficient 
(PTE = 100) according to three of the DEA specifications.  Column 4 indicates, 
however, that once the DEA analysis includes both resource costs as an input, and 
adequately allows for the influence of environmental factors, their relative efficiency 
scores decline appreciably.  In the case of the Northumbria police force, the PTE 
score declines from 100 to 95.20 and the efficiency rank falls from 1st to 12th.  
Similarly, the PTE score of the Suffolk force is reduced from 100 to 92.90 and the 
rank declines from 1st to 14th. 
 More extreme examples of the misleading performance measures provided by 
the performance radar analysis are provided by the Wiltshire and Warwickshire 
forces, however.  With respect to the former, Figure 1 clearly indicates that this force 
is performing well above average (relative to its assigned comparator forces) across 
the three relevant domains.  According to the various DEA specifications, however, 
Table 1 illustrates that this particular force’s efficiency ranking ranges between 15th 
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and 23rd.  The performance radar illustrated in Figure 1, however, indicates that the 
Warwickshire force displays “average performance” in respect of investigating crime 
and resource usage, and slightly below average performance in respect of reducing 
crime.  With respect to the DEA analysis, however, the Model One results (which 
correspond most closely to the performance radar analysis) suggest that the 
Warwickshire is one of the poorest performing forces, with Stage One and Stage Two 
efficiency ranks of 32nd and 34th respectively.  The Model Two results, however, 
suggest that the Warwickshire force is one of the best performing forces with PTE 
scores of 100 (rank = 1st) under both the Stage One and Two approaches. 
 In summary, therefore, these results suggest strongly that the performance 
radar approach adopted by the Home Office in the UK is methodologically flawed 
and overly simplistic, and can produce very misleading relative performance 
measures.  This is potentially very serious if these results are used to inform target 
setting and relative resourcing decisions.  Particularly serious shortcomings in the 
performance radar approach relate to:  the failure to relate desired outcomes to the 
resources utilised in attaining these outcomes; the failure to incorporate the potential 
impact of environmental factors; the ambiguity regarding the set of comparator forces 
selected for individual forces, and the consequent inability to contrast the results of 
forces on a pair-wise basis and to produce performance rankings.  Finally, the use of 
performance radars also presents difficulties in respect of how to appropriately weight 
the outcomes across the various domains in order to produce a relative measure of 
overall performance, most especially when performance in some domains is above 
average and in others below.  In contrast, the DEA approach represents a more 
analytically robust methodology which can address all these shortcomings inherent in 
the performance radar approach.  Furthermore, the various DEA results reported in 
Table 2 indicate clearly that it is very important to adequately account for both 
environmental influences and resource cost / usage in order to produce a fair and 
unbiased measure of police performance or efficiency. 
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V.  PUBLIC CONFIDENCE AND FORCE EFFICIENCY 
 
Due to reservations concerning the use of survey data, and due to potential size 
related biases associated with the use of percentage figures as outputs (outcomes) in 
DEA, we elected not to utilise the two domains, citizen focus and promoting public 
safety, in the initial comparison of DEA and the performance radar approach.  
Notwithstanding our reservations with respect to these two domains, however, they 
are employed by the UK Home Office in the relative assessment of police force 
performance.  The purpose of this second stage regression analysis, therefore, is 
twofold.  Firstly, to establish if there is any relationship between the two sets of 
survey results and police efficiency.  Specifically, are variables relating to the public’s  
“fear of crime” and  their perception of whether the police are “doing a good job” 
related to the intrinsic economic efficiency of police forces, as measured by the DEA 
scores pertaining to the three domains, ‘resource usage’, ‘investigating crime’, and 
‘reducing crime’.  Secondly, to establish whether other variables such as 
environmental variables (demographic and socio-economic variables), and incidence 
of crime variables have a significant influence on these survey based domains. 
 In order to ensure that we have adequately accounted for any environmental 
variable impact on the actual DEA scores, we use only the Stage Two PTE results.  
As these have been ‘purged’ of any environmental factors in the two stage Fried et al 
(1999) DEA analysis, it is legitimate to use these PTE scores as an independent 
variable, along side the environmental factors, in the second stage Tobit regression 
analysis.  Given that the inclusion or exclusion of resource costs may have an impact 
on the second stage regression results, however, we report these both with respect to 
Model One and Model Two. 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 
 
 It is clear from Table 2 that, with respect to the fear of various types of crime, 
the variable PTE is not a significant explanatory variable under either the Model One 
or Model Two specification.  This is a significant result as it raises question-marks 
over the inclusion of this type of survey-based variable in any assessment of police 
performance given that there appears to be little that the police can do to influence 
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these fears in terms of improving their underlying efficiency.  In other words, these 
fear of crime results appear to be essentially outside the influence of individual police 
forces.  This view is reinforced by the finding that there is only a very minimal 
influence of the incidence of crimes on the recorded fear of crime.  In the case of the 
‘fear of violent crime’, for example, none of the incidence of crime variables appear 
to be significant explanatory variables.  Similarly, in the case of the ‘fear of burglary’ 
regression, the incidence of burglaries, robberies, and violent crime are not 
significant.  Surprisingly, the incidence of ‘other crimes’ is found to be a significant 
and correctly signed explanatory variable, but only at the 10% level.  Finally, with 
respect to the ‘fear of vehicle crime’, the incidence of vehicle crime is found to be a 
significant explanatory variable, and is significant at the 5% level under Model Two. 
 Hence, the lack of significance of PTE in the fear of crime regressions, 
combined with the lack of any strong and consistent influence from the incidence of 
crime to the fear of crime raises question-marks over both the veracity of the survey 
data and the logic of including these types of fear of crime variables as a separate 
domain in the performance radar analysis.  This argument is reinforced by the fact 
that, in both the DEA and performance radar approaches, the incidence of crime is 
formally included in the analysis as an input performance domain respectively.  One 
would suspect that the general levels of various types of crime would inevitably have 
a very powerful influence on the public’s fear of crime.  Hence, the fact that this is not 
showing up conclusively in the Tobit regression results tends to confirm our 
reservations over the use of this type of survey based data. 
 It is interesting to note, however, that a number of environmental variables 
appear to be significantly related to the public’s fear of crime, and these relationships 
generally conform to a priori expectations.  The fact that the ‘fear of violent crime’ is 
negatively and significantly related to the variable TERRACED HOUSING, for 
example, may relate to the fact that such communities tend to be relatively “close-
knit” and more densely populated.  The converse of this may explain why the ‘fear of 
burglary’ is positively and significantly related (at the 10% level) to the variable 
SPARCITY.  Finally, the ‘fear of vehicle crime’ seems to be negatively and 
significantly related to the daytime population (DAYTIME) under Model Two, as 
well as positively and significantly related to the level of vehicle crime.  This may 
reflect a higher probability of detection, particularly during the daytime.  It may also 
reflect economic conditions, in the sense that areas with a high daytime population are 
 21
likely to be those that have a vibrant business community and a relatively high level 
of regional wealth. 
The fact that such socio-economic variables are outside to control of 
individual police forces, however, serves to reinforce the argument that survey 
responses, such as fear of crime measures, should not form a domain in respect of 
police performance measurement.  It could be argued, moreover, that responsibility 
for influencing measures (‘fear of crimes’) which are themselves strongly influenced 
by socio-economic factors should rest with the Government rather than individual 
police forces.   
 Finally, with respect to the remaining domain, citizen focus, it is clear from 
Table 2 that PTE is a positive and significant explanatory variable in respect of the 
publics perception of the police as ‘doing a good or excellent job’.  Interestingly, 
however, this is only the case for Model One and not Model Two.  This strongly 
suggests that the public have a reasonably accurate view of the efficiency of police 
forces as it relates to domains such as reducing crime and investigating crime (which 
are captured by Model One).  It is clearly less easy for the public to assess the 
efficiency of police forces in “value for money” terms, and this may explain why PTE 
is not significant under Model Two (which includes resource costs as an additional 
input).  Once again, however, it is clear that the public’s perception of whether the 
police are doing a good job is also influenced by variables such as the incidence of 
crime (robberies are negative and significant at the 10% level in Model Two), and 
environmental variables such as INCOME SUPPORT (a government insurance 
scheme for the unemployed and those on low income), which is positive and 
significant at the 5% level. 
 
 
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper provides a critique of the so-called ‘performance radar’ approach 
introduced by the UK Home Office in order to assess the relative performance of 
police forces.  Specifically, the relative efficiency of UK police forces is analysed 
across the three non-survey based performance domains specified by the Home Office 
using the well established technique of DEA.  In order to ensure that external or 
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environmental factors, which may impact on relative efficiency levels, are adequately 
accounted for, we employ the two-stage approach of Fried et al (1999).  Furthermore, 
both the production and cost approaches are specified in order to establish whether the 
omission of resource usage costs as an input can result in biases in relative efficiency 
measurement in respect of policing.  Our results confirm that the latter is indeed the 
case.  We also establish that it is extremely important to adequately incorporate the 
impact of environmental variables, as failure to do so can produce misleading and 
unfair relative performance measures.   
More significantly, the comparison of the DEA results with the ‘performance 
radar’ relative performance measures suggest that, while there is often a great deal of 
consistency at the extremes of the performance spectrum, in many cases the latter 
approach can produce highly misleading assessments of the performance of individual 
police forces.  A central weakness of the ‘performance radar’ approach is the failure 
to relate the outputs or outcomes of individual police forces directly to the resources 
(costs) incurred in their production.  This serious omission is rectified by the cost 
specification of the DEA approach.  From a policy perspective, the impact of the 
inclusion of resource costs on relative efficiency measures (using DEA), combined 
with the marked differences between the DEA results and ranks, and those of the 
‘performance radar’ approach, suggests that it would be inadvisable to utilise the 
latter results in target setting or resource allocation decisions.  
 Notwithstanding reservations concerning the use of survey data in the 
assessment of policing performance, the second stage Tobit regressions indicated that 
the technical efficiency of the police appears to have no impact on the various ‘fear of 
crime’ indicators specified in the Promoting Public Safety domain.  Furthermore, 
there was only very limited evidence of any link between the incidences of crime and 
the publics fear of crime.  Clear evidence did emerge, however, of the influence of 
socio-economic variables on the publics fear of crime.  As these factors are outside 
the control of individual  police forces, however, this result, combined with the other 
evidence, strongly suggests that this type of survey data should not be used in the 
context of police performance domains.   
Finally, with respect to the Citizen Focus domain, it appears that the technical 
efficiency of the police under the production approach does have a significant and 
positive impact on the public’s perception of ‘whether the police are doing a good 
job’.  There is no such relationship, however, in respect of technical efficiency as 
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measured using the cost approach.  This strongly suggests that the public have an 
accurate perception of relative police  performance in respect of crime levels and 
crime fighting (clearing up crimes), but not in respect of value for money.  As the 
latter has tended to be the main objective of governments in recent years, this result 
again calls into question  the legitimacy of using this type of survey based data in the 
context of police performance domains. 
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 TABLE 1. 
English and Welsh Police Force Pure Technical Efficiency (PTE) Results 
Police Force Area and 
Region 
PTE (M1) 
Stage One 
PTE (M1) 
Stage Two 
PTE (M2) 
Stage One 
PTE (M2) 
Stage Two 
Avon and Somerset 16.30     (39) 40.90     (41) 40.20     (41) 52.00     (41) 
Bedfordshire 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 
Cambridgeshire 16.10     (40) 71.50     (29) 74.30     (19) 83.70     (20) 
Cheshire 27.00     (31) 74.50     (25) 56.10     (36) 80.10     (25) 
Cleveland 14.40     (41) 54.30     (40) 67.30     (28) 78.40     (26) 
Cumbria 45.70     (21) 83.00     (14) 87.90     (12) 93.00     (13) 
Derbyshire 33.30     (26) 75.80     (24) 60.90     (34) 72.00     (34) 
Devon and Cornwall 92.90     (10) 95.00     (10) 92.90     (11) 95.60     (11) 
Dorset 21.30     (36) 82.50     (15) 73.10     (23) 83.00     (21) 
Durham 34.20     (25) 77.10     (22) 73.60     (21) 83.00     (21) 
Dyfed Powys 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 
Essex 67.30     (18) 82.30     (16) 67.30     (29) 81.40     (23) 
Gloucestershire 25.20     (33) 72.80     (27) 87.80     (13) 92.70     (15) 
Greater Manchester 74.10     (13) 74.30     (26) 74.60     (18) 73.30     (33) 
Gwent 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 
Hampshire 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 
Hertfordshire 17.40     (38) 69.00     (33) 49.10     (40) 63.10     (39) 
Humberside 27.80     (30) 56.60     (38) 59.10     (35) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
70.20     (35)  
Kent 71.70     (14) 81.00     (17) 71.70     (25) 80.20     (24) 
Lancashire 69.20     (16) 78.70     (20) 74.20     (20) 77.10     (29) 
Leicestershire 40.00     (22) 76.00     (23) 68.80     (27) 78.00     (27) 
Lincolnshire 30.30     (28) 71.80     (28) 81.20     (16) 89.20     (18) 
Merseyside 48.40     (20) 70.70     (31) 49.60     (39) 67.00     (37) 
Norfolk 20.90     (37) 70.90     (30) 63.30     (33) 75.60     (31) 
North Wales 29.30     (29) 86.70     (11) 69.80     (26) 100.00   (1) 
North Yorkshire 25.20     (33) 66.10     (35) 65.90     (31) 77.50     (28) 
Northamptonshire 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 
Northumbria 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 95.20     (12) 
Nottinghamshire 31.50     (27) 60.00     (37) 64.70     (32) 73.50     (32) 
South Wales 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 
South Yorkshire 37.80     (24) 56.00     (39) 53.20     (37) 62.80     (40) 
Staffordshire 48.60     (19) 78.60     (21) 67.30     (29) 76.20     (30) 
Suffolk 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 92.90     (14) 
Surrey 22.40     (35) 62.10     (36) 51.40     (38) 65.50     (38) 
Sussex 69.30     (15) 80.80     (18) 72.70     (24) 84.50     (19) 
Thames Valley 84.00     (11) 83.40     (13) 85.80     (14) 95.70     (10) 
Warwickshire 25.60     (32) 66.70     (34) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 
West Mercia 75.80     (12) 86.00     (12) 79.70     (17) 92.20     (16) 
West Midlands 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 100.00   (1) 
West Yorkshire 68.70     (17) 69.20     (32) 73.40     (22) 67.40     (36) 
Wiltshire 38.90     (23) 78.80     (19) 81.80     (15) 89.30     (17) 
M1 and M2 denotes Model One and Model Two which respectively excludes and includes ‘net 
expenditure’ as an extra input. 
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 Public Confidence a
Dependent Variable: W
 Mo
 Estimate 
Constant 16.5682** 
PTE 0.0521 
Burglaries 0.0004 
Vehicle Crime -0.2 E-04 
Robberies -0.5 E-04 
Other Crimes 0.0001 
Income Support 0.3 E-04 
Day population -0.6 E-05 
Terrace Housing -21.3854** 
Lone Parent Households 52.4668 
Sparsity 8.9689 
Sigma 3.3529** 
 
Dependent Variable
 Mo
 Estimate 
Constant 9.4675* 
PTE -0.0386 
Burglaries 0.1 E-04 
Vehicle Crime 0.0001 
Robberies -0.0004 
Other Crimes 0.0002* 
Income Support 0.5 E-04 
Day population -0.9 E-05 
Terrace Housing -9.3085 
Lone Parent Households 6.5069 
Sparsity 53.6259* 
Sigma 2.3213** 
** and * den  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 TABLE 2 
nd Force Efficiency Regressions 
 
orried About Violent Crime 
 
del One Model Two 
Standard 
Error 
Estimate Standard 
Error 
8.3464 19.8759** 8.3174 
0.0574 -0.0073 0.0657 
0.0003 0.0003 0.0004 
0.0002 -0.3 E-05 0.0002 
0.0008 -0.0002 0.0007 
0.0002 0.0002 0.0001 
0.5 E-4 0.2 E-04 0.6 E-04 
0.5 E-05 -0.7 E-05 0.5 E-05 
10.9476 -21.4506** 11.1218 
96.9323 45.2897 97.7279 
46.4659 15.9203 48.3015 
0.3703 3.3859** 0.3739 
: Worried About Burglary 
 
del One Model Two 
Standard 
Error 
Estimate Standard 
Error 
5.7784 9.4022* 5.6933 
0.0397 -0.0467 0.0449 
0.0002 0.2 E-04 0.0002 
0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 
0.0005 -0.0003 0.0005 
0.0001 0.0002* 0.0001 
0.4 E-04 0.3 E-04 0.4 E-04 
0.3 E-05 -0.8 E-05 0.3 E-05 
7.5794 -10.2217 7.6129 
67.1091 17.2169 66.8948 
32.1697 58.7639* 33.0624 
0.2563 2.3177** 0.2559 
otes significant at the 5% and 10% critical level respectively.29
 
 TABLE 2 (cont.) 
Public Confidence and Force Efficiency Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable: Worried About Vehicle Crime 
 
 Model One Model Two 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
Estimate Standard 
Error 
Constant 6.335 5.9507 3.6500 5.7858 
PTE -0.0059 0.0409 0.0512 0.0457 
Burglaries -0.0004 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0002 
Vehicle Crime 0.0004* 0.0002 0.0004** 0.0001 
Robberies -0.0004 0.0005 -0.0003 0.0005 
Other Crimes 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0001 
Income Support 0.3 E-04 0.4 E-04 0.4 E-04 0.4 E-04 
Day population -0.1 E-04 0.3 E-05 -0.1 E-04** 0.3 E-05 
Terrace Housing -10.9252 7.8053 -9.9873 7.7366 
Lone Parent Households 77.9468 69.1098 73.5469 67.9824 
Sparsity 53.6712 33.1288 42.9242 33.5999 
Sigma 2.3905** 0.2639 2.3554** 0.2601 
 
Dependent Variable: Police Doing an ‘Excellent or Good’ Job. 
 
 Model One Model Two 
 Estimate Standard 
Error 
Estimate Standard 
Error 
Constant 55.9716** 6.6604 58.9725** 6.8639 
PTE 01056** 0.0458 0.0665 0.0542 
Burglaries 0.0002 0.0003 0.7 E-04 0.0003 
Vehicle Crime -0.8 E-04 0.0002 -0.4 E-04 0.0002 
Robberies -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0010* 0.0006 
Other Crimes -0.4 E-04 0.0001 0.5 E-04 0.0001 
Income Support 0.9 E-04** 0.04 E-04 0.0001** 0.5 E-05 
Day population -0.3 E-05 0.4 E-05 -0.5 E-05 0.4 E-05 
Terrace Housing -5.2502 8.7362 -3.8824 9.1782 
Lone Parent Households -95.6742 77.3521 -118.675 80.649 
Sparsity -58.2260 37.0799 -60.1509 39.8606 
Sigma 26756** 0.2955 2.7943** 0.3086 
** and * denotes significant at the 5% and 10% critical level respectively. 
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 FIGURE 1 
Performance Radar’s of Selected English and Welsh Police Forces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Gwent Dyfed-Powys 
Hampshire Avon and Somerset 
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 Northumbria Suffolk 
FIGURE 1 (cont.) 
Performance Radar’s of Selected English and Welsh Police Forces 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Home Office (2002)
Wiltshire Warwickshire 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 32
